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I. INTRODUCTION
On Wednesday, July 12, 1995, for the first time in the 150-year
colonial history of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Legislative Council
(Legco) voted on a motion of no-confidence against its British-appointed
Governor, Chris Patten.' "If passed in a conventional parliament, such a
motion would bring down the government. "2 However, the no-confidence
motion had no binding effect on the Governor., Nonetheless, the
Democratic Party, chaired by Martin Lee made the motion to indicate its
stern disapproval over the agreement of the Court of Final Appeal (CFA)
reached between Britain and the People's Republic of China (China) in
June 1995.4 The motion was defeated by a two-to-one margin.5
Formal negotiations between Britain and China over the reversion
of Hong Kong in 1997 from Britain to China began in the early 1980s.
Criticism against the motivations, procedures, and outcomes of these
negotiations has been abundant, but none has amounted to a formal
objection as severe as a vote of no-confidence on the Hong Kong Governor
himself. What is in the CFA agreement that triggered such a hostile
response? Lee called the agreement a "landmark sellout, a landmark
betrayal. "6 Was it? Or did the agreement provide sufficient safeguards to
ensure an independent judicial system and the continuation of rule of law
in Hong Kong after 1997, as claimed by Barrie Wiggham, the
Commissioner of Hong Kong Economic and Trade Affairs?7
The first part of this paper gives a brief background of Hong Kong
as a British colony and its judicial system. Next, the sources and the
events leading up to the CFA agreement is examined. Following this, is a
description of the CFA agreement and three major controversial issues
regarding the CFA. Next, a prediction about the independence and
operation of the CFA is presented and finally, a summary is presented of
the CFA issue in Hong Kong.
1. Martin Lee, No Confidence in Hong Kong's Highest Court, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July
12, 1995, at 10.
2. Id.
3. Legco Supports Patten In Confidence Vote, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 13, 1995, at 8.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Peter Stein, Hong Kong Court Pack Has Mixed Appeal, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 12,
1995, at 1.
7. Barrie Wiggham, No Legal Vacuun in Hong Kong, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1995, at
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II. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF HONG KONG AS A BRITISH COLONY AND
ITS JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Hong Kong can be divided into three areas geographically: Hong
Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula and the Stonecutters Island, and the
New Territories which border mainland China. These three areas became
British colonies at different times. When Britain defeated China at the end
of the Opium War in 1842, China ceded Hong Kong Island in perpetuity to
Britain in the Treaty of Nanking.' Eighteen years later in 1860, more
conflicts between Britain and China led to the signing of the Convention of
Peking in which the Kowloon Peninsula and the Stonecutters Island were
ceded to Britain, again in perpetuity. 9 Nearly four decades later, based on
the Convention of 1898, China agreed to lease the New Territories to
Britain for a period of ninety-nine years, commencing on July 1, 1898.10
Therefore, the reversion of Hong Kong to China in 1997 technically
concerns only the New Territories." However, the three areas,
"collectively referred to as 'Hong Kong,'" have since 1898 functioned "so
interdependently as one economic unit that any partition would threaten the
viability of the colony itself. Therefore, the transfer must include the
entire territory." 2 Consequently, Hong Kong is used in this paper to refer
to all three areas.'3
After colonizing Hong Kong in 1842, Britain simply imported the
bulk of the common law of England into Hong Kong."1 Hong Kong
received its constitution, including primarily the Letters Patent and the
8. Nancy C. Jackson, The Legal Regime of Hong Kong after 1997: An Examination of
the Joint Declaration of the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China, 5 INT'L TAX &
Bus. L., 379-80 (1987).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. China basically considers all the three treaties mentioned above invalid because they
are all "unequal treaties" signed when China was helpless against western aggression. Therefore,
it can be said that China's position was that there was no need to terminate the treaties because
they were never in effect. The negotiation with Britain was political rather than legal. Lawrence
A. Castle, Comment, The Reversion of Hong Kong to China: Legal and Practical Questions, 21
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 327, 328-33 (1985).
12. Jackson, supra note 8, at 380 (citing Davies, How Britan Fell for the Peking Game
Plan, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 21, 1984, at 44).
13. For a detailed account of how Hong Kong became a British colony, see Susan L.
Karamanian, Comment, Legal Aspects of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on the Future of Hong
Kong, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 167, 168-70 (1985).
14. Daniel N. Abrahamson, Capital Punishment in Post-Colonial Hong Kong: Issues,
Answers, and Options, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1219, 1221 (1992).
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Royal Instructions, from the British Government. , Further, Hong Kong
obtained a ready-made judicial system with all cases going to the Privy
Council in London for final appeals.16 However, the Privy Council is a
court of limited jurisdiction over Hong Kong, and it only hears cases from
Hong Kong which raise new points of law.7 The Hong Kong Supreme
Court retains final jurisdiction over all other cases. 8 Government figures
show that in the last three years the Privy Council spent seven to nine
weeks each year hearing cases from Hong Kong.' 9
III. THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL
A. Sources
When China resumes sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1,
1997,2 Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China (HKSAR) pursuant to article 31 of the
Constitution of China. 2' For obvious reasons, the Privy Council will no
longer be able to serve as the place of final adjudication for Hong Kong
cases. Another body is needed to take this role.
Britain and China issued the Joint Declaration, the first formal
agreement between Britain and China concerning the future of Hong
Kong, in 1984.2 The Joint Declaration states that the HKSAR will be
vested with "executive, legislative and independent judicial power,
including that of final adjudication. 23 Further, the Joint Declaration states
that "[tihe power of final judgment of the [HKSAR] shall be vested in the
15. A. Chen, Hong Kong's "Basic Law" from the Perspective of Comparative
Constitutions, N.Z. L.J. 383, 384-85 (1989).
16. Id.; Frankie Fook-Lun Leung, Hong Kong's Transition: Some Noticeable Changes, 12
Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoP. L.J. 51, 53 (1989). The courts in the colonial era in America were
also "set up by the same British colonial authorities who set up the Hong Kong Supreme Court,
and colonies' final appeals went to the same Privy Council in London from the beginning in 1683
until the American Revolution in 1776." Paul Kerson, Grounds for Appeal in China, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 25, 1995, at 19.
17. Susan Noakes, Final Appeal Court Assures Stable Legal System, FIN. POST, Nov. 4,
1995, at 48.
18. Id.
19. Court "To Sit Two Months A Year," S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 27, 1995, at 5.
20. JOINT DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG, at 1, Dec. 19, 1984 [hereinafter Joint Declaration];
XIANFA [Constitution], ch. 1, art. 31 (1982) (P.R.C.).
21. Id.
22. Joint Declaration, supra note 20.
23. Id. at 3(3); see id. at annex I, § III.
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court of final appeal in the [HKSAR]. . . . "24 Hence, a Court of Final
Appeal is to be established to replace the Privy Council.
The Joint Declaration promised that the National People's
Congress of the People's Republic of China (NPC) would enact a Basic
Law for the HKSAR. 25 The Basic Law intends to reflect the policies
adopted by the Joint Declaration and serve as a miniconstitution for the
HKSAR. 21 Accordingly, the Basic Law, which was adopted by the
Seventh NPC at its third session on April 4, 1990, also provided for the
establishment of the CFA. 21 Similarly, the CFA is to be vested with the
"power of final adjudication. "29
B. Events Leading to the CFA Agreement
A Sino-British Joint Liaison Group (Joint Liaison Group) was set
up pursuant to and to implement the Joint Declaration.30 The Joint Liaison
Group presented a proposal on the CFA to China for the first time in
1988.31 Before an agreement was reached, the demonstration of Chinese
students in Tinnamen Square took place which climaxed with the massacre
on June 4, 1989.12 The massacre substantially increased the mistrust of the
people in Hong Kong towards China. This feeling was, however, mutual
with the Chinese Government. Alarmed by Hong Kong's open support of
the student demonstration in Tinnamen Square and severe criticism against
the June 4th massacre and the defection of China's own people to Hong
Kong following the massacre, China became "apprehensive about Hong
Kong becoming a subversive base against China . . . ."14 Since the
massacre in 1989, the "Chinese population of Hong Kong have been
apathetic toward the Draft Basic Law, or anything proposed by the Beijing
24. Id. at annex I, § III, & 4.
25. Id. at 3(12) and annex I, § I, 1.
26. Id.
27. Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 1226.
28. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. IV, § 4, art. 81. (Apr. 4, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp4-4.htm>.
29. Id. at § 4, art. 82.
30. Joint Declaration, supra note 20, at annex III.
31. Noakes, supra note 17.
32. HSIN-CHI KUAN, HONG KONG AFrER THE BASIC LAW 16 (1990).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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government."" This attitude certainly did not facilitate any cooperation
between Britain, China, and Hong Kong. In fact, in October 1989 the
NPC expelled two Hong Kong residents, Lee and Szeto Wah, from the
Drafting Committee for the Basic Law because of their leading roles in
supporting the democratic movement in China. 36  The mistrustful
atmosphere continued, and it is easy to understand that the Legco would
flatly reject the first draft of the CFA Bill in 1991.17 The rejection was
grounded mainly on the Bill's allowance for only one foreign judge on the
five-member CFA bench.3 8
Legco's rejection of the first CFA agreement in 1991 brought an
abrupt end to any further negotiation on the CFA issue. Indeed, in 1992
the focus of Britain and China was on the electoral reform package
introduced by Governor Patten, which broadened Hong Kong's democratic
system3' by extending the franchise of functional constituencies to 2.7
million.- China responded to the legislative reform violently, accusing
Patten of breaching the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law and
threatening to disband the legislature elected under the reform.41 Talks
broke down between Britain and China on Hong Kong's electoral reform
in July 1993, which was followed by NPC's passing a resolution to
disband the three tiers of government after the handover in 1994.42 Despite
China's threat, Hong Kong's electoral reform became law the same year.4 3
In other words, the relationship between China and Britain had been
antagonistic since 1992." As a result, virtually nothing took place on the
CFA negotiation from 1991 through 1994.41
35. Berry F. Hsu & Philip W. Baker, The Spirit of Common Law in Hong Kong: The
Transition to 1997, 24 U.B.C. L. REv. 307, 313 (1990).
36. Id.
37. Noakes, supra note 17.
38. Robin Fitzsimons, Is Hong Kong Facing a Legal Sell-out?, TIMES (London), Aug. 1,
1995, available in 1995 WL 7687409; see Noakes, supra note 17.
39. Associated Press, Britain, China Agree to Save Hong Kong's Legal System, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, June 10, 1995, at A22.
40. Chronology, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 4, 1995, at 3, available in 1995 WL
7536827.
41. Associated Press, supra note 39.
42. Chronology, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. Louise do Rosario, Future Imperfect: Lawmakers Approve Post-1997 Court Despite
Flaws, FAR E. ECON. REv., Aug. 10, 1995, at 26.
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The CFA agreement was so crucial to Hong Kong's future" that
Britain could no longer merely react to China's threat. The CFA had to be
in place. Therefore, in April 1995 Britain forced China to reopen the
negotiation on the CFA by threatening to act unilaterally in the formation
of the CFA.4" The negotiation finished on May 30th,'48 and the current
CFA agreement was reached in June 1995.49 Although the CFA agreement
was heavily criticized,50 Legco passed it thirty-eight to seventeen, with five
abstentions. , '
C. The Agreement
The CFA Bill is long and complex, but the agreement reached in
June 1995 on the CFA consisted of only five paragraphs, which aimed to
clarify ambiguous or undecided points from the past. The most important
aspects of the agreement are found in paragraph 3: The British side agrees
to amend the Court of Final Appeal Bill to include the formulation of acts
of state in article 19 of the Basic Law and to provide that the Court of
Final Appeal Ordinance shall not come into operation before June 30,
1997.52 In other words, the CFA will not operate until China resumes its
sovereignty of Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. Further, the CFA will be
precluded from hearing cases concerning acts of state. The full text of the
June agreement can be found in Appendix A. Although not contained in
the June agreement, China's insistence on allowing only one foreign judge
on the CFA was also incorporated into the CFA Bill.5 3 In conjunction with
this agreement, Governor Patten presented it to Legco for consideration.
45. Peter Stein & Marcus W. Brauchli, London and Beijing Agree on High Court for Hong
Kong, WALL ST. J. EUIR., June 12, 1995, at 2.
46. Consul General Richard W. Mueller, America's Long-Term Interest in Hong Kong,
Transcript, Vol. 6, No. 21, ISSN: 1051-7693; May 2, 1995, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, May 22,
1995, available in 1995 WL 8643565.
47. Noakes, supra note 17.
48. Id.
49. Chronology, supra note 40.
50. Chris Yeung et al., Fight Not Over, says Martin Lee, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
27, 1995, at 1.
51. World Politics and Policy: Three Singapore Leaders Awarded Record Damages in
Libel Case, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 27, 1995, at J5, available in 1995 WL 8779320.
52. See infra, Appendix A, § 3.
53. Louise do Rosario, A Court Too Far: 'Democrats Vow to Reject Sino-British Accord,
FAR E. ECON. REV., June 22, 1995, at 20.
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The transcript of his official statement with respect to the CFA Bill and
agreement is available in Appendix B.1
IV. CONCERNS OVER THE CFA AGREEMENT
A. The Significance of the CFA in Hong Kong's Future
The Basic Law guarantees that HKSAR will "exercise a high
degree of autonomy . . . and independent judicial power."" The legal
system of HKSAR will, to a large extent, decide the degree of autonomy
HKSAR will enjoy as a part of China. 6 The CFA is the center of the legal
system in Hong Kong. Whether Hong Kong will truly be vested with the
final adjudication power as stated in the Basic Law will depend on the
independence and jurisdiction of the CFA. 7 In addition, the independence
of the CFA is paramount to the continuation of the rule of law in
HKSAR." Hong Kong's success has been based on its fair, efficient, and
independent legal system under which businesses flourish.1 Business has
come to Hong Kong because of its legal system and the rule of law.6
Indeed, Senator Craig Thomas warned that if the rule of law were to give
way to "family or party connections," businesses will become "skittish and
pull out." 61 If Hong Kong were to remain as a world's leading financial
center, the rule of law must continue to exists because:
business people must be able to rely on the courts'
upholding the sanctity of contracts and on the impartial
enforcement of commercial laws and regulations. In this
connection, the establishment of a court of final appeal
54. Governor Patten's statement contains succinct accounts of the difficulties on reaching
the CFA agreement and the official views and explanatory notes with respect to the CFA
agreement.
55. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. I, art. 2. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cpl.htm>.
56. Jackson, supra note 8, at 381.
57. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. I, art. 2. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cpl.htm>.
58. Hsu & Baker, supra note 35, at 329-31.
59. Johannes Chan, A Bill of Rights for Hong Kong, in CIVIL LIBERTIES IN HONG KONG
72, 87 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1988); see Louis Kraar, The Death of Hong Kong, FORTUNE, June
26, 1995, at 118.
60. Editorial, Courting Disaster: Britain and China Agree on Court of Not-Quite-Final
Appeal, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 22, 1995, at 5.
61. Louise do Rosario, Courting Disaster?, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 6, 1995, at 61.
62. Mueller, supra note 46.
[Vol. 3:843
Leung
before 1997 would be a crucial step in maintaining
confidence in Hong Kong's ability to operate an effective
legal system after the transition and to avoid damaging
legal gaps. 63 Even the public at large is concerned with the
continuation of the rule of law. People . . . must feel
secure about the protection of their basic rights. People
who look over their shoulder for fear of arbitrary arrest or
detention, or who fear they cannot get a fair trial in the
event they are charged with an offense, are not the kind of
people who built Hong Kong."
Therefore, unlike other issues relating to the reversion of Hong
Kong in 1997, the CFA issue directly affects the future existence of the
rule of law in Hong Kong, which is determinative of Hong Kong's
continued prosperity after 1997.
Since so much is at stake on the CFA, its formation is closely
scrutinized by anyone who has interests in Hong Kong's future. The
concerns over the CFA agreement are primarily in three areas:
1) the exclusion of the CFA's jurisdiction over acts of state and the
ambiguity of what constitutes acts of state;
2) the scheduled date of the opening of the CFA on July 1, 1997, the date
on which China assumes sovereignty over Hong Kong;
3) the permission of only one foreign judge sitting on the five-member
CFA bench.
B. Acts of State
The June agreement on the CFA explicitly precludes the CFA
from hearing cases concerning acts of states" by incorporating article 19 of
the Basic Law. Article 19 consists of three arguably inconsistent
paragraphs.67  The first paragraph grants HKSAR the power of final
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Fitzsimons, supra note 38.
66. See infra, Appendix A.
67. The full text of art. 19 of the BASIC LAW is:
The [HKSARJ shall be vested with independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication.
The courts of the [HKSAR] shall have jurisdiction over all cases in the Region, except
that the restrictions on their jurisdiction imposed by the legal system and principles
previously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained.
The courts of the [HKSAR] shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as defense
and foreign affairs. The courts of the Region shall obtain a certificate from the Chief
1997]
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adjudication. The second paragraph authorizes HKSAR to hear "all cases
in the Region." However, HKSAR courts, including the CFA, cannot
hear cases for which they have not had jurisdiction under the British rule.
Conceptually, such limitation could take away the HKSAR's final
adjudication power after 1997 because the Privy Council in London
possesses the power of final adjudication for Hong Kong cases. Further,
all cases does not really mean all cases. Paragraph 3 explains that
HKSAR "shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as defense and
foreign affairs. "69
The Joint Declaration contains a similar phrase: "[tihe [HKSAR]
will enjoy a high degree of autonomy except in foreign and defense affairs
which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government.""
However, the Joint Declaration does not qualify the meaning of final
adjudication when mentioning the CFA in the HKSAR. In this respect, the
Basic Law is not true to the spirit manifested in the Joint Declaration.
Conversely, it could be argued that the provision in the Basic Law on
limiting the CFA's jurisdiction outside acts of state is consistent with the
Joint Declaration because the phrase "foreign and defense affairs" in the
Joint Declaration modifies the entire administration of the HKSAR, thus
including the CFA. These two polar interpretations on whether the CFA
agreement is in harmony with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law are
evident in the attitudes of the supporters7' and opposers72 of the CFA
agreement.
Entrusting China with the responsibilities of handling defense and
foreign affairs of Hong Kong is actually common in autonomous
Executive on questions of fact concerning acts of state such as defense and foreign
affairs whenever such questions arise in the adjudication of cases. This certificate shall
be binding on the courts. Before issuing such a certificate, the Chief Executive shall
obtain a certifying document from the Central People's Government.
The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's Republic Of
China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr. 4, 1990, ch.
II, art. 19, (Apr. 1, 1997) <http:/Iwww.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp2.htm>.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Joint Declaration, supra note 20, 3(2).
71. Hong Kong Attorney General Jeremy Matthews claimed that the CFA's jurisdictional
limitations on acts of state should not be considered a concession because the CFA agreement
merely reflects what is already in the Basic Law, noting: "It is strange that when we propose to
align the court on this point with the Basic Law, we are accused of kowtowing. But when others
propose to amend the bill to align it with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law then that
becomes a matter of principle." Matthews Strikes at Opposition, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
June 15, 1995, at 6.
72. Michael C. Davis, A Common Law Court in a Marxist Country: The Case for Judicial
Review in the Hong Kong SAR, 16 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (1987).
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arrangements. 7  However, excluding the CFA from hearing cases
concerning acts of states without clearly defining the scope of acts of state
is disturbing. Act of state is not defined in the Basic Law. The words
defense and foreign affairs do not define acts of state but merely give
examples to what may be acts of state. But what else may be considered
acts of state by the Chinese government? Acts of state in common law
"typically relate to the making of treaties with foreign countries,
declarations of war, and the seizure of land or goods in right of
conquest. "7 Attempts to amend the CFA Bill to restrict acts of state to its
common law definition were unsuccessful.15 Therefore, the bottom line is
that CFA cannot hear cases on acts of state, but no one is sure what that
means.
The potential problems with a loose definition of acts of state are
alarming. The United Nations recently warned that the ambiguity of acts
of state may give China the chance to curtail the CFA's power. 6 In fact,
the entire judiciary of HKSAR will be affected." Acts of state could mean
different things on any given occasion. Even worse is that the power of
interpretation of the Basic Law, including the meaning of acts of state,
ostensibly rests in the hands of the Standing Committee of the NPC. 78 Will
China deem the following events acts of state:
73. Roda Mushkat, Hong Kong as an International Legal Person, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
105, 138 (1992).
74. Simon Holberton, Hong Kong Law Under Chinese Law. The Interface Between Basic
and Common Law, FIN. TIMES, June 12, 1995, at 3; see Frank Ching, Agreement on Court of
Final Appeal Raises New Questions, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 29, 1995, at 36.
75. Clause Raises Worries on Human Rights after '97, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 27,
1995, at 5.
76. Bruce Gilley, Hold your Ground: Colony Protests at China's Efforts to Trim Bill of
Rights, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 16, 1995 at 36.
77. Mushkat, supra note 73, at 138.
78. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. VIII, art. 158. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp8.htm>.
The Chinese Constitution of 1982 does not subscribe to the concept of separation of powers.
Instead, all powers are unified in the NPC. The Central People's Government and the Judiciary
are formed by and accountable to the NPC. The NPC, however, meets only once a year for a
few days and its great size makes it unwieldy. Thus, its Standing Committee has assumed all
practical importance. It enjoys exclusive right to interpret the Constitution and the laws and
shares with the NPC the right to supervise the implementation of the constitution. It can also
enact laws not specifically reserved for the NPC. When the NPC is not in session, the Standing
Committee approves plans and government budgets, appoints and removes ministerial personnel
and decides on the composition of the National Military Commission, upon the recommendation
of its chairman. KUAN, supra note 32, at 4.
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1) The suppression of protest or the arrest of dissidents; 9
2) a commercial dispute involving a state-owed enterprise such as the
Bank of China;w
3) any allegedly unlawful acts committed by China's State Security
Ministry officials in HKSAR;8"
4) taking of land by the People's Liberation Army? 82
The list can go on. In fact, it has been suggested that the meaning of acts
of state is simply going to be a variable after 1997; China's attitudes and
interpretations towards acts of state "will depend on the political situation
in Hong Kong at the time, the degree of confidence Beijing has in the
Chief Executive, and the nature of cases coming before the courts."83
These uncertainties, however, are unacceptable in the rule of law system
because, "the legal system which exemplifies or proclaims the Rule of
Law as an ideal is characterized by its neutrality, rationality, formality,
impartiality, and impersonality: a government of laws, not of men, of
rules rather than discretion, of preordained result in preference to intuitive
justice. "
Further, the role of the Chief Executive ' in the interpretation of
acts of state is questionable. Article 19 directs the HKSAR courts to
obtain a binding certificate from the Chief Executive on questions of fact
concerning acts of state such as defense and foreign affairs whenever such
questions arise in the adjudication of cases. Before issuing such a
certificate, the Chief Executive shall obtain a certifying document from the
Chinese Government.6 Why will the future HKSAR courts need to obtain
a questions of fact certificate from the Chief Executive where the current
judicial practice is for the courts themselves to decide whether they have
79. Holberston, supra note 74, at 36.
80. Connie Law, Appeal Court Deal Salvaged, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 27, 1995,
at 2.
81. Holbertson, supra note 74.
82. Id.
83. Holberton, supra note 74, at 3.
84. Peter Wesley-Smith, Protecting Human Rights in Hong Kong, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HONG KONG 17, 19 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1992). Professor Smith qualifies the meaning of the
rule of law in terms of six overlapping principles, which are reprinted in full text in Appendix C.
85. The Chief Executive will be the head of the HKSAR. Appointed by the Chinese
Government, the Chief Executive will serve in a similar capacity like the British Governor today.
The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's Republic Of
China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr. 4, 1990, ch.
IV, § 1, art. 43-58. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp4-1.htm>.
86. See supra note 66.
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subject matter jurisdiction?"' And what is the function of this questions of
fact certificate which the Chief Executive cannot issue without first
consulting with the Chinese Government? Responding to the accusations
that such a certificate will subject the CFA's jurisdiction under the
arbitrary decisions of the Chief Executive, the Hong Kong Attorney
General explains that this certificate "relates only to facts, not the
interpretation of what is or is not an act of state.""
This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the effects
for the Chief Executive to issue a certificate on purely questions of facts
may well be the same as one on questions of law with respect to the
jurisdiction of the CFA. This is because the statement of facts of a case
can be so phrased that it will lead itself into a conclusion of the law. For
example, if the Bank of China is sued for breach of contract, it is within
the Chief Executive's power to issue a certificate of facts stating that the
Bank of China acts in this particular case strictly as an agent of China, thus
rendering the action an act of state. Similarly,
it is not difficult to imagine that many cases touching the
powers of the post-1997 Hong Kong Government will be
said to concern its relationship with the central authorities
in Peking. If that were claimed, no one could dispute it;
for it is a question of fact on which . . . the CFA must
obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive. 1
Secondly, the only place where the Basic Law addresses the scope of the
acts of state is in article 19. If the Chief Executive does not decide what
acts of state are, who does? It cannot be the CFA itself because its
decisions are not final since the court is bound by the question of fact
certificate. Therefore, the most logical reading of article 19 is that it gives
the decision of what constitutes acts of state to the Chief Executive, whose
decisions are contingent upon China's approval, noting again that the NPC
has the ultimate power to interpret the Basic Law.10 Therefore, it seems
apparent that by agreeing to incorporate article 19 into the CFA
agreement, Britain has given to the Chief Executive and China control
over the jurisdiction of the CFA.
87. Mushkat, supra note 73.
88. Jeremy Matthews, Letter to Ed., Hong Kong Rule of Law, TIMES (London), July 25,
1995, available in 1995 WL 7686246.
89. Geoffrey Lewis, Letter to Ed., Hong Kong Rule of Law, TIMES (London), Aug. 14,
1995, available in 1995 WL 7690169.
90. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. VIII, art. 158. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp8.htm>.
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Encircled by these limitations, is the CFA really a misnomer?
More importantly, has the rule of law been lost in the future HKSAR over
the CFA agreement? Lee believes it has.9' He considers that "Britain has
handed China a more effective and less obvious tool for manipulating
[Hong Kong's] legal system before the verdict, when political authorities .
• . [NPCI may decide which cases involve acts of state and are thus out of
judicial bounds."9
Perhaps it is not this uncommon at all for the central government
to have final jurisdiction on certain issues over its autonomous entities.91
"When appropriately constrained, this jurisdiction does not inevitably
threaten the judiciary's right of final adjudication. "1 However, as noted
above, the language of the CFA agreement certainly does not appropriately
constrain China in its exercise over the meanings of acts of state. Will
China voluntarily constrain itself and not abuse its power? Lee does not
count on it.95 If the CFA were to begin hearing cases prior to the
transition, it may help shape the interpretation of acts of state under British
rule and set up some precedents. However, this is out of the question now
as the CFA is scheduled to begin operation on July 1, 1997.
C. CFA to Start on July 1, 1997
The CFA is scheduled to begin operation on the first day China
resumes sovereignty over Hong Kong. However, the target date for the
establishment of the CFA was at one time in 1992.9 Although this proved
to be impossible when Legco rejected the first CFA agreement in 1991," at
the time Britain and China reached the CFA agreement in June 1995, they
could have arguably scheduled to open the CFA before the reversion.
Why did they not?
The judicial development in Hong Kong before China resumes
sovereignty is vital to the "successful maintenance of the common law
judicial system." 8 Establishing the CFA before July 1, 1997, would have
allowed the court to gain precious experience and avoid any potential
91. Jonathan Mirsky, Hong Kong QCDefies China Ban, TIMES (London), Aug. 15, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 7690312.
92. Lee, supra note 1.
93. Brian Z. Tarnanahah, Post-1997 Hong Kong: A Comparative Study of the Meaning of
"High Degree of Autonomy, " 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 41, 54-55 (1989).
94. Id.
95. Lee, supra note 1.
96. Leung, supra note 16.
97. Noakes, supra note 17.
98. Hsu and Baker, supra note 35, at 308.
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problem for legal vacuum. More importantly, the early establishment of
the CFA could ensure a strong legal framework ready to take Hong Kong
through the transition and minimize China's opportunity to meddle with
the CFA.1 Hong Kong government officials' desire to set up the CFA
before 1997 was nearly unanimous even days before reaching the CFA
agreement with China.100 The CFA agreement thus evidences an important
compromise on Britain's part.
The choice of setting up the court in July 1997 is poor. Even over
the controversial issue concerning acts of state, one can still find positive
reviews of the issue. However, not a single article or comment exists
which compliments the choice of July 1, 1997, as the date on which the
CFA will start hearing cases. To the contrary, some consider "Britain's
biggest failure in the talks was its inability to convince China to allow the
court to be set up before 1997."111 Some criticize that if Britain were to
make concession after concession over the CFA issue, it should have at
least insisted on setting up the CFA while it is still in power, thus ensuring
its proper formation.,02
It has been reported that China requested the CFA be set up after it
has regained sovereignty over Hong Kong.103 China wants to be seen as
the party who bestows judicial independence on the HKSAR.101 As much
as Britain wanted to set up the CFA prior to 1997 so that it would have
time to observe its operation or even mold its shape to its liking, China,
probably for the same reasons, resisted an early establishment of the
CFA.10 1 "From Beijing's point of view, it did not design a way of keeping
Hong Kong's court system on a tight leash only to let Mr. Patten - not
their favorite governor - introduce some slack into the system just before
the handover of sovereignty.' 0
It is not difficult to imagine that China might have deliberately
delayed the establishment of the CFA in order to increase its control over
it. China spent 1993 getting upset at the electoral reform introduced by
99. Id.
100. What They Said Before, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 10, 1995, at 3.
101. Holberton, supra note 74, at 3.
102. Connie Law & Catherine Ng, Legal Profession, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 10,
1995, at 3.
103. Graham Hutchings, International: Hong Kong Rages Against New Court, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH LONDON, June 11, 1995, at 25.
104. Id.
105. Holberton, supra note 74, at 3.
106. Id.
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Governor Patten and refused to consider the CFA issue in most of 1994.107
July 1, 1997, can arguably be a logical date for the CFA to start operating
since the Privy Council will stop hearing cases from Hong Kong on June
30, 1997.1' However, if there are aspects of the CFA which are
inconsistent with the agreement and the Basic Law, could one rely solely
on the good faith of China to make any needed correction? It is anybody's
guess now.
D. The Four To One Fornula
Both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law allow the CFA to
invite "judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the [CFA]. "'0
Legco rejected the 1991 CFA agreement largely because it allowed only
one foreign judge to be on the CFA bench."'0 However, the June 1995
CFA agreement mirrored that of 1991 in the ratio of judges for the CFA:
"[The CFAI would consist in each sitting of the Chief Justice, three
permanent Hong Kong judges and one non-permanent judge, who could be
from Hong Kong or from another common law jurisdiction. The
permanent and non-permanent Hong Kong judges could be either local or
expatriate.""' The Chief Justice of the CFA must be a Chinese citizen
who is a permanent HKSAR resident with no right of abode in any foreign
country."2
There are primarily three concerns over allowing only one foreign
judge in the CFA. First, the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law allow the
invitation of judges to sit on the bench. The plural form is indicative of
more than just one. Therefore, the CFA agreement's limitation of only
one judge is allegedly in violation of the Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law." 3 Secondly, the reason for appointing a foreign judge in the CFA is
to increase CFA's independence." 4 The more foreign judges on the bench,
107. Fitzsimons, supra note 38.
108. See No Kwai-Yan, Pledge on Handover of Appeals, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug.
17, 1995, at 4.
109. Joint Declaration, supra note 20, at annex I, § III, 4; The Basic Law Of The Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh
National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr. 4, 1990, ch. IV, § 4, art. 82. (Apr. 1,
1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp4-4.htm>.
110. Fitzsimons, supra note 38.
111. See infra Appendix B.
112. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. IV, § 4, art. 90. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp4-4.htm>.
113. Dick Thornburgh, A Blow to Hong Kong's Future, WASH. POST, July 30, 1995, at C9.
114. Rosario, supra note 53, at 20.
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the more resistant the CFA will be against China's influence.' " Thirdly,
limiting the bench to only one foreign judge also means that four judges
must be chosen from a limited pool of judges "potentially susceptible to
Chinese government influence" and thereby compromising the
independence and efficiency of the CFA. 116 Some worry that Hong Kong
does not "have enough legal talent available to give the court the stature it
needs to win the confidence of international investors."" 7 In addition,
despite the criteria listed in the Joint Declaration which states that "judges
shall be chosen by reference to their judicial qualities,""'  China has
already expressed its desire to pick judges "for their political reliability
rather than their knowledge of colonial laws."" 9
It is important to note that only the Chief Justice needs to be Hong
Kong Chinese. The three other permanent judges may be of any
nationality. 2 o Further, article 92 of the Basic Law authorizes recruiting of
even permanent judges from other common law jurisdiction.
Consequently, it is possible to have a CFA bench consisting of only one
Hong Kong Chinese (the Chief Justice), three British expatriate permanent
judges, and a foreign non-permanent judge. On the other hand, all five
members of the bench may be of Chinese ancestry. Therefore, the
combination of the CFA is actually quite flexible. It is somewhat
remarkable that China would let any foreign judge be on the bench at all
because "China believes allowing the court to be transposed from London
to Hong Kong rather than to Beijing, and allowing any foreigner at all to
sit on the bench, are major concessions of Chinese sovereignty."'' Given
these considerations, the limitation of only one foreign judge on the CFA
bench is perhaps not unreasonable.1'2
It is beyond dispute that the quality of the CFA bench controls the
independence of the CFA. 12 The permission to allow expatriates to be
permanent judges in the CFA offers reasonable safeguards to their qualities
115. Thornburgh, supra note 113, at C9.
116. Rosario, supra note 44, at 26.
117. Mike Steinberger, Companies Ring-Fence Assets in Hong Kong Twilight Raid, TIME
(London), Aug. 4, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7688478.
118. Joint Declaration, supra note 20, at annex I, § I1, & 3.
119. Gilley, supra note 76, at 36.
120. Noakes, supra note 17, at 48.
121. Wing Kay Po, The Sound and the Fury of the Court of Final Appeal, E. EXPRESS, May
3, 1995, at 15.
122. Fitzsimons, supra note 38.
123. Wai-Kong Fung, Legal Councillor in Neutral Stance, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept.
28, 1995, at 6.
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and impartiality. On the five-member bench, unless there are three or
more foreign justices coming from other jurisdictions not susceptible to
China's influence, there is a potential that the CFA is under, even
indirectly, the influence of China. In this limited sense, the CFA is never
sure to be totally neutral. China obviously will not allow more than one
foreign judge to be in the CFA, let alone three. Since the HKSAR will
after all be a part of China, and the CFA will be the highest court in the
region, China's concession of allowing one foreign judge on the CFA
bench is not entirely unjustified. Arguing in favor of the combination of
the CFA, Commissioner Wiggham of Hong Kong Economic & Trade
Affairs questioned: "[c]an you imagine a law requiring a foreigner on the
U.S. Supreme Court?" 1'2 Although the analogy is not completely correct,
the argument may be applicable with respect to the CFA.
E. China Dropped Demand on Post-Verdict Remedial Mechanism
Britain claimed that China also made compromises on the CFA
agreement. China had insisted on the CFA agreement giving the Chief
Executive the power to overturn CFA decisions, although this would have
been in violation of both the letter and spirit of the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law.1 5 China had wanted this post verdict remedial mechanism
based on the fear that the CFA might render erroneous decisions which
would leave it with no recourse.
The June CFA agreement addressed this issue in paragraph 2,
which reads:
[t]he Chinese side agrees to the British side amending the
Court of Final Appeal Bill to make it clear that Section
83P of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance applies in a case
where an appeal has been heard and determined by the
Court of Final Appeal, and that there is therefore no need
for further legislative or other provisions in relation to the
power to inquire into the constitutionality of laws or to
provide for post-verdict remedial mechanisms. 1 26
Applying section 83P of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance to the CFA
means that the Chief Executive may direct the CFA to retry a case upon
124. Wiggham, supra note 7, at A16.
125. China's Day in Court, TIMES (London), June 10, 1995, at 18, available in 1995 WL
7674680.
126. See infra, Appendix A.
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receiving new and relevant evidence.121 This provision is a lesser evil than
granting the Chief Executive an outright power to overturn CFA cases, but
it nonetheless leaves the door ajar for interference from the Chief
Executive.'1 The comforting thoughts are that the Chief Executive's
power to reopen cases under this provision is limited to only criminal cases
and contingent upon the discovery of new and relevant evidence. Lee did
not consider the dropping of the post-verdict remedial mechanism as a
concession for China because such mechanism was unnecessary in light of
the CFA agreement; China has already gained the power to remove any
cases from the jurisdiction of the CFA before the verdict under the acts of
state clause. 29 Lee's positions may be extreme but are valid interpretations
of the CFA agreement.
V. THE DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE CFA AND THE
SURVIVAL OF RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG
The CFA agreement has concluded, and Britain and China are on
their way to organizing the court. Will the CFA be able to ensure the
continuation of rule of law in Hong Kong? Will China refrain from
interfering with the decisions of the CFA given the holes in the CFA
agreement? The author proposes to answer these questions by examining
China's internal and external restraints on exercising controls over the
CFA.
A. China's Internal Restaint - its Respect for Rule of Law
Rule of law, as the contemporary world knows it, was not a
prominent part of Chinese history. In fact, "part of China's tradition
includes a hostility to law and to lawyers.",'n The Confucians believed that
people ought to govern themselves "in a general code of morality and
ritual and strongly opposed publicly promulgated laws."'' In conjunction
with this sentiment towards law, China was, for a long time, ruled by
emperors. The emperors and their officials, without exception, had "an
absolute right to rule and the people were under an absolute obligation to
obey. There was no conception of government powers being limited by
127. No Kwai-Yan & Quinton Chan, Jurisdiction, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 10,
1995, at 3.
128. Id.
129. Lee, supra note 1, at 10.
130. Michael H. Armacost, The People's Republic of China: Economic Reform,
Modernization and the Law, 3 CHINA L. REP. 153, 157 (1986).
131. Id.
1997]
862 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 3:843
law ... ",32 Law was only viewed as the means of "dealing with crime
and punishment. . . .-,"
Today's Communist Chinese attitudes concerning the rule of law
do not deviate substantially from its Confucian tradition. The Central
Government controls all phases of the country's operation, and every
person and organization must obey the centralized leadership of the
Communist Party. ,'4 Appointed government officials often assume both the
executive and judicial roles." The law, including the Chinese
Constitution, is malleable by the leaders and subject to change at any given
time. 1 6  Important policies can be made in China absent any statutory
authorities.' 7 Although the development of the Chinese legal system has
been remarkable and rapid,'3 the legal system is still only developing.' 39
Some judges in China can still be bought.' ' ° Chinese courts that are
supposedly independent are not really independent because of the
"complete and well-entrenched executive bureaucracy" and "an
incomplete and tentative legal system."' 4' Additionally, there are those
who stand to lose under rule of law because the current state of law in
China allows them to "punish political dissenters, intimidate critics, take
care of their friends and enrich their families without fear of lawsuits." 2
Rule of law, therefore, is not a concept commonly practiced in China.
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LIBERTIES IN HONG KONG 107, 108 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1988).
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What do all these mean to the CFA and the rule of law in
HKSAR? First, it is very unusual for the centralized Chinese Government
to grant so much autonomous power to a region, as Hong Kong will soon
enjoy. "One country, two systems""4 3 is a novel idea that poses a certain
degree of threats to some leaders in China.'" Not everyone in China was
happy about the Joint Declaration and how the reversion of Hong Kong
would take place.'15 Ji Pengfei'"4 understood these China's concerns.
When he presented the Draft Basic Law to the NPC in 1990, he carefully
explained the decision of vesting the HKSAR with the power of final
adjudication;
[t]he draft vests the courts of the [HKSAR] with
independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication. This is certainly a very special situation
wherein courts in a local administrative region enjoy the
power of final adjudication. Nevertheless, in view of the
fact that Hong Kong will practice social and legal systems
different from the mainland's, this provision is
necessary. 14
Will China be content with the power that it has given to Hong
Kong? Keeping in mind that the Chinese government can easily bypass its
own law to achieve its objectives in China, one could imagine it must be
tempting for China, after 1997, to exert its power over the HKSAR and
taint the rule of law system so carefully preserved by the Basic Law.
Secondly, it is natural to equate the Basic Law as Hong Kong's
mini-constitution.'" However, it is a bad idea if China does so. China
views its constitutions differently from the west. Instead of treating its
constitutions as the "embodiments of unchanging principles binding on the
government," China has changed its constitutions frequently since the PRC
was formed. 4 9  Therefore, it is more accurate to characterize these
143. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
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documents as "descriptions of prevailing policy aspirations.' China's
cavalier attitude towards its constitutions is reflective of its treatment to
rule of law. Therefore, as the CFA agreement has incorporated article 19
of the Basic Law, the CFA agreement can be modified by amending the
Basic Law, which is within the power of the NPC.'5 ' Although the Basic
Law states that "[n]o amendment to this Law shall contravene the
established basic policies of the [PRC] regarding Hong Kong,"'5 2 this is
really not much of a safeguard given that the Standing Committee of the
NPC has the power to interpret the Basic Law.' 3 For these reasons,
China's internal restraint, which is its respect to rule of law, may not be
sufficient to prevent it from interfering with the CFA.
B. China's External Restraint - Reactions of Business in Hong Kong
and the World Towards an Ineffective CFA
China's interests in the continued prosperity of Hong Kong are
substantial. '5 Despite Shanghai's development, Hong Kong will remain
China's most important financial center after 1997.11, Hong Kong serves
as a gateway for foreign investment in China, and China has no rational
reasons to tamper with that.' 6  In fact, the success of China's rapid
economic development depends on the support of Hong Kong.' 7
Consequently, "[e]ven the pessimists ... in Hong Kong don't express the
fear that China will suddenly impose an iron hand on Hong Kong or seek
to punish it for its success."I'
Business thrives under the current Hong Kong legal system. The
business world responded favorably to the CFA agreement because the
agreement eliminated a lot of uncertainties with respect to the post-1997
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judicial system in Hong Kong.1S9 Hong Kong's credit rating raised as a
result of the agreement."
However, it is evident that investors are cautious about the
agreement. Since the negotiation between Britain and China began over a
decade ago, 261 of the 529 listed companies in Hong Kong have shifted
their legal domiciles to Bermuda and another fifty to the Cayman Islands. 16
Both places' courts of final appeal are the Privy Council in London.'16
These companies have not relocated back to Hong Kong because of the
CFA agreement. Further, some companies have even attempted to bypass
Hong Kong's legal system by either putting arbitration clauses in their
contracts' 3 or by stipulating the governing law of their contracts not be
Hong Kong's nor China's.' Some believe that these companies have not
lost faith in Hong Kong's future but are merely handling uncertainty in a
harmless way.'6 However, the measures taken by these companies clearly
demonstrate that they are willing and prepared to pull out of Hong Kong if
it becomes necessary.
Investors are not the only group whose interests are at stake on the
CFA issue. Taiwan also watches the situation closely. The way China
handles Hong Kong will set a precedent for its ability to respect the rule of
law and the one country, two systems idea.'66
In short, Hong Kong's prosperity and status as a financial center
are crucial to China's economy. Investment may stop if investors believe
that the Hong Kong legal system has become a lottery after 1997.167 China
knows it. In today's electronic age, money that flows into a region or
country overnight can leave just as quickly. '16 Further, if China is serious
about attracting Taiwan for reunification, its treatment towards Hong Kong
will speak louder than any treaties than can be conceived. These are the
external restraints faced by China in how it will handle the CFA. They are
strong and very real.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The CFA agreement reflects two competing interests. The Basic
Law guarantees that "the socialist system and policies shall not be
practiced in the [HKSAR], and the previous capitalist system and way of
life shall remain unchanged for fifty years." 19 Therefore, it is in the
interest of Hong Kong to carve out a specific and explicit CFA agreement
that establishes the precise jurisdiction and power of the CFA.7 0 On the
other hand, the last thing that China wants is a CFA agreement that is too
restrictive, leaving no wiggle room at all for China. 7' China needs
flexibility and the ability to interfere with the operation of the CFA
"without violating its international obligations."'
Britain considered the CFA agreement to be the best it could be
under the circumstances.3 It was either the June agreement or no
agreement at all.'7 4 The CFA agreement has its weak points, but it did
remove some uncertainty about Hong Kong's future judicial system and
revealed how much control China really wants over the CFA. Blatant
violation of the CFA agreement and the rule of law by China is unlikely
because of the potential reactions from the business community and its
possible far-reaching repercussions on China's own economy and the
Taiwan issue.
The CFA agreement is a compromise. China has obtained the
control that it needed to remove important cases from the jurisdiction of
the CFA under the acts of state clause. It is uncertain, however, how
frequently, and under what circumstances, China will exercise this power.
Excess exercise of this power will render CFA's final adjudication power a
nullity. However, discretion over acts of state on China's part also means
there is room for negotiations and restraints. Therefore, mature and
skilled diplomatic relationships and negotiation with China, ironically, may
better ensure Hong Kong's continuation of rule of law.", A statement
made by Alice Tai, Hong Kong Judiciary Administrator, about the CFA
perhaps most succinctly captures the author's feeling towards the CFA
agreement and the future rule of law of the HKSAR:
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[p]redictions of a doomsday scenario after 1997 did
nothing but damage . . there were bound to be teething
problems as the Judiciary adapted to changing
circumstances and the setting up of the Court of Final
Appeal. During these years we may well be gritting our
teeth. But so long as we are confident, then our courts
will mature and we will have a conduit for success . . a
certain amount of skepticism among Hong Kong people
was understandable because they had the most to lose. But
if there was only criticism and talk of the system of justice
not working, it would lead to people becoming
disheartened .... 176
When Lee moved for the no-confidence vote against Governor
Patten, was he really making a no-confidence vote on the future of Hong
Kong? When Legco defeated the no-confidence vote and supported
Governor Patten, did the Legco at the same time indirectly cast a
confidence vote on the CFA and the future rule of law in Hong Kong?
The author has confidence in Hong Kong's future rule of law and the
CFA, not because of the CFA agreement, but because of the ability of the
people in Hong Kong to turn a bad situation around and make the best out
of it.
APPENDIX A
THE CFA AGREEMENT, reprinted in S. CHINA MORNING POST, June
10, 1995, at 2.
THIS is the full text signed between the senior British and Chinese
representatives of the [Joint Liaison Group]:
AFTER full consultations, the two sides of the Sino-British Joint
Liaison Group have reached the following agreement on the question of
the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong:
1. The British side agrees to amend the Court of Final Appeal Bill
on the basis of the eight suggestions published by the Political Affairs Sub-
group of the Preliminary Working Committee of the Preparatory
Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on May 16,
1995.
2. The Chinese side agrees to the British side amending the Court
of Final Appeal Bill to make it clear that Section 83P of the Criminal
176. Cliff Buddle, Doomsayers 'Hurt Faith in Legal System " S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 24, 1995, at 4.
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Procedure Ordinance applies in a case where an appeal has been heard and
determined by the Court of Final Appeal, and that there is therefore no
need for further legislative or other provisions in relation to the power to
inquire into the constitutionality of laws or to provide for post-verdict
remedial mechanisms.
3. The British side agrees to amend the Court of Final Appeal Bill
to include the formulation of acts of state in Article 19 of the Basic Law
and to provide that the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance shall not come
into operation before 30 June, 1997.
4. The Chinese side agrees that, after the Chinese and British
sides reach this agreement, the legislative procedures for the Court of
Final Appeal Bill, on which the two sides have reached a consensus
through consultation, will be taken forward immediately to enable them to
be completed as soon as possible before the end of July 1995. The
Chinese side will adopt a positive attitude in this regard.
5. The Chinese and British sides agree that the team designate of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, with the British side
(including relevant Hong Kong Government departments) participating in
the process and providing its assistance, be responsible for the preparation
for the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal on 1 July, 1997 in
accordance with the Basic Law and consistent with the provisions of the
Court of Final Appeal Ordinance.
APPENDIX B
Statement about the Court of Final Appeal in the Legislative Council on
June 9, 1995
The following is the transcript of the Governor, the Right
Honorable Christopher Patten's statement about the Court of Final Appeal
in the Legislative Council on June 9, 1995:
Mr. President, I would like to make a statement about the Court of
Final Appeal.
Late last night, the British and Chinese experts in the Joint Liaison
Group reached agreement on the establishment of the Court of Final
Appeal. The agreement was signed by the Senior Representatives to the
[Joint Liaison Group] at 2:30 p.m. this afternoon, following endorsement
of its terms by the Executive Council this morning.
Members have before them the text of the agreement, which we
are of course publishing in full. It is an agreement which I am entirely
satisfied is in the interests of Hong Kong. It carries the full support of the
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British, Chinese and Hong Kong Governments and I recommend it to this
Council.
Accordingly, we are getting the draft Bill on the Court of Final
Appeal this afternoon, and will introduce it into this Council on June 14.
Before coming to the terms of the agreement itself, let me remind
Honorable Members briefly of the history of the Court of Final Appeal
issue.
Both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law provide for Hong
Kong to have its own Court of Final Appeal to fill the role now performed
by the Judicial Committee the Privy Council after the transfer of
sovereignty on June 30, 1997. In September 1991, Britain and China
reached agreement in the [Joint Liaison Group] on the early establishment
of the CFA, and on its composition. It would consist in each sitting of the
Chief Justice, three permanent Hong Kong judges and one non-permanent
judge, who could be from Hong Kong or from another common law
jurisdiction. The permanent and non-permanent Hong Kong judges could
be either local or expatriate.
In December 1991, however, this Council passed a motion seeking
greater flexibility in the appointment of overseas judges than was provided
for in the 1991 agreement. Subsequently, the Chinese side made it clear
that they were not prepared to re-negotiate the agreement or allow a CFA
set up on any other basis to survive 1997. So the only effect of the Legco
vote was to oblige the Hong Kong Government to delay the introduction of
the CFA Bill into Legco.
We nevertheless began to draft the Bill, which Members will soon
see is a long and complex one. In May 1994, we handed the draft Bill to
the Chinese side for comments. The Chinese asked for expert talks in late
March this year, and since then there have been four rounds, which
culminated in the agreement we reached last night.
The agreement means that we can now be certain that the CFA to
be set up on July 1, 1997 will be a proper Court of Final Appeal that will,
subject to the Basic Law, have the same function and jurisdiction as the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It also means that our CFA Bill
will provide the legislative basis for establishing the Court in Hong Kong
on July 1, 1997. Our aim is to enact the Bill before the end of the current
legislative session.
Let me now take Honorable Members through the five key points
of the agreement in slightly more detail.
Point one sets out our agreement to amend the CFA Bill on the
basis of the eight suggestions made by the PWC Political Affairs Sub-
Group on May 16. As Honorable Members will know, we have
previously agreed to incorporate most of these points into the CFA Bill.
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We sought clarification from the Chinese side on the two points about
which we had reservations. These were related to the procedure for
appointing the Chief Justice and the question of the extension of the term
of judges beyond retirement age. We are now satisfied that they are
consistent with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
On the first point, the Chinese side clarified that the independent
Commission referred to in Article 88 of the Basic Law will be chaired by
the Chief Justice after the first SAR Chief Justice has been appointed. The
recommendation in respect of the appointment of the first Chief Justice
will be made by the other members of the Commission. The Chief
Executive will conduct this meeting of the Commission, but will take no
part in making the recommendation. There is therefore no question of the
independence of the Commission being undermined; and once the first
Chief Justice has been appointed, the Chief Executive will have no further
role in the conduct of Commission meetings.
On the second point we were concerned that the PWC suggestion
that extensions of service beyond retirement age should be made by the
Chief Executive in accordance with the recommendations of the Chief
Justice was inconsistent with the provision in Article 88 of the Basic Law
that judges should be appointed by the Chief Executive in accordance with
the recommendation of the independent Commission. However, the
Chinese side pointed out that there is no specific reference in the Basic
Law to the procedure for extending the term of judges beyond retirement
age. The fact that at present the JSC advises on these extensions is a
procedure, rather than a legal requirement. So we agree that this
suggestion would not be a violation of the Basic Law. The Chief Justice,
in making recommendations to the Chief Executive, would of course not
be precluded from seeking advice from the Commission.
Point 2 of the Agreement sets out our agreement to make a
consequential amendment to the CFA Bill to put beyond doubt that section
83P of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance will also apply to an appeal
which has been heard and determined by the CFA. This section provides
that the Governor may refer a case to the Court of Appeal when, for
example, new evidence comes to light which shows that a conviction was
unsafe. It applies at present to a Hong Kong appeal which has been heard
and determined by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The latter part of Point 2 of the Agreement sets out the Chinese
side's agreement that there is no need for any further legislative or other
provisions in relation to the power of the courts to inquire into the
constitutionality of laws or to provide for post-verdict remedial
mechanisms. We consider this an extremely important point, as it will
ensure that the jurisdiction of the CFA will, subject to the provisions of the
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Basic Law, be the same as that of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council.
Point 3 of the agreement contains our agreement that the CFA
Ordinance shall not come into operation before June 30, 1997. On this
basis, we have agreed to include in the CFA Bill the formulation of acts of
state in Article 19 of the [Basic Law], which will in any case apply as from
July 1, 1997.
Point 4 is important in that it makes clear that China agrees with
the CFA Bill and is content that it should be taken forward immediately.
The early enactment of the CFA Bill will ensure that the CFA to be set up
on July 1, 1997 will be based on the principles and practices of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council and that it will be a genuine Court of
Final Appeal.
The preparations for the setting up of the CFA on July 1, 1997 are
set out in Point 5 of the Agreement. This will be undertaken by the team
designated for the SAR, with the participation and assistance of the British
side, including the relevant Hong Kong Government departments. The
Chinese side have told us that the term team designate refers to the Chief
Executive (designate) and the principal officers (designate) of the SAR
Government, together with others qualified to take part in the
establishment of the SAR. Once the CFA Bill has been enacted, we will
be discussing with the Chinese side the modalities of this cooperation.
Honorable Members and the business community have
understandably been concerned about the possibility of a judicial vacuum
in the hiatus between the end of the role of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council and the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal. This
agreement will avoid any question of a judicial vacuum in 1997. It will
not occur before July 1, 1997, because the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council will keep its jurisdiction to hear appeals from Hong Kong courts
until June 30, 1997. We have obtained the British Government's
assurance that the Privy Council will continue to hear appeals from Hong
Kong up until the last possible date, and will make every effort to ensure
that outstanding business from Hong Kong is dealt with before July 1,
1997. And there will not be a vacuum after July 1, 1997, because the
CFA will be operational on that date, all the necessary preparations having
been made beforehand. The CFA Bill contains sensible transitional
provisions for any outstanding cases to be transferred from the Privy
Council to the CFA. We will be discussing with the Privy Council and the
team designate practical arrangements for putting these provisions into
effect.
As Honorable Members know, in 1991 our aim was to establish
the Court as soon as possible to give it time to build up experience before
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the transfer of sovereignty. In my view it would plainly have been better
had we been able to set the Court up earlier than 1997. That has always
been my preference. But Members made it clear in 1991 that they did not
wish to proceed on the basis of the 1991 agreement.
Until very recently, we were facing the unenviable choice of either
introducing the CFA Bill into Legco without Chinese agreement and no
guarantee that any Court set up as a result would survive 1997, or leaving
the establishment of the Court to the [HKSAR] after July 1, 1997. The
agreement we have now concluded gives us, gives this Council, the means
by which we can guarantee the nature of the CFA to be set up on July 1,
1997, guarantee its establishment in accordance with a Bill passed by this
Council this year, and guarantee that it will endure.
For too long there has been uncertainty about the CFA. As
Honorable Members know, the people of Hong Kong and international
investors want to know now how the Court will be set up, when it will be
set up and what sort of Court it will be. By enacting the Bill that we will
introduce next Wednesday, this Council can answer these questions.
You have before you what I believe to be a good agreement. It is
an agreement which provides for a Court to be set up entirely in
accordance with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, ready to start
work on July 1, 1997. It offers the prospect of a Court that will, subject to
the Basic Law, have precisely the same function and jurisdiction as the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It offers the certainty of
continuity because the Court will be set up with unequivocal Chinese
support. It offers certainty about the terms of the Court because this
Council will be able to pass the necessary legislation to set those terms in
concrete before the end of July. I recommend this agreement to the
Council and I very much hope that Honorable Members will support the
Bill when it is introduced into the Council.
APPENDIX C
Rule of Law Defined. Peter Wesley-Smith, Protecting Human Rights in
Hong Kong, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONG KONG 17, 18-19 (Raymond
Wacks ed., 1992).
The Rule of Law can be explained in terms of six overlapping
principles. First legal doctrine is a formal and rational system: its
precepts are self-consistent and generalized, made by persons with
acknowledged lawmaking competence in accordance with a regular, open
procedure. This means that the law can be described and known and acted
upon independently of its political and economic context; its institutions,
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its methodology, and its personnel are autonomous vis-a-vis other areas of
social life. Law can be ascertained in an impartial manner by anyone
trained in its techniques. This requires that all law is published and
available and that the relationship between different types of law is settled.
Judges, who ultimately identify and apply law, have very little discretion,
and thus they dispense a kind of justice which can be described as formal--
resulting from the regular application of pre-existing doctrine to neutrality
ascertained facts--rather than substantive or intuitive. The law is therefore
certain and predictable and applied equally to all persons.
Secondly, law is the antithesis of arbitrary power. It does not
depend on whim or caprice but on fixed rules existing prior to conduct
which is subject to their standards; it is prospective in operation, not
retrospective. No person ought to be condemned by the legal system
except for a breach of established law ascertained by the law's impartial
tribunals, whereas the exercise of arbitrary power (that is, behavior which
is indifferent to the law) can be prevented or subsequently condemned by
agents of the legal system.
Thirdly, the law applies equally to all persons, whatever their
social status, rank, class, political influence, physical strength, wealth,
ideological commitment, race, nationality, or sex. Even government
officials, lawmakers, and judges are subject to the general law in the same
manner as ordinary citizens. The law is no respecter of persons; it is
capable of being applied impartially by independent judges and officials
acting in obedience to judicial and legislative commands.
Fourthly, judges are independent of political and personal
pressure; their duty is to make findings of fact and to ascertain and apply
the law in a neutral manner without regard to the wishes of the executive
arm of government. They are experts (in the "artificial reason of the
law") whose independence is institutionally guaranteed and who may
review the legality of all behavior, including the fashioning of law and its
execution. They may not, however, have a personal interest in
proceedings; they are bound to decide in accordance with law, not
personal preference. Lawyers, too, are obliged to present cases to the best
of their ability, regardless of their own views as to the moral or political
worth of their clients. All citizens are entitled to equal access to the legal
system through remedies which relate to their rights, and to be heard, to
know the allegations against them, and to have their conduct assessed by
impartial judges.
Fifthly, law is capable of guiding an individual's behavior. Its
purpose is to provide a measure for the conduct of human affairs, and thus
it is general rather than particular, and it is published, prospective,
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comprehensible, consistent, constant, fairy administered, and able to be
obeyed.
Finally, law is advantageous to the individual: it stabilizes social
relationships, providing a settled framework for social intercourse; it
promotes order and personal security and an environment conducive to
economic welfare; it respects human dignity and individual autonomy; and
it ensures a reliable, predictable kind of justice. Without these virtues the
systematic provision and maintenance of civil liberties would be
impossible.
